This paper proposes a stochastic congestion and pricing model that combines a bottleneck model with stochastic queuing to study roadway congestion and pricing. Employing this model, two pricing schemes are developed: one is omniscient pricing for which the transportation administrative agency is assumed to be aware of each and every traveler's cost structure (i.e., their detailed valuation of journey cost as well as early and late penalties), and the other is observable pricing, for which only queuing delay is considered. Travelers are characterized by their lateacceptance level and the effects of various compositions of late-averse, late-tolerant and lateneutral travelers on congestion patterns with and without pricing are discussed. Numerical simulation indicates that omniscient pricing scheme is most effective in suppressing peak hour congestion and distributing demands over longer time horizon. Also, congestion pricing is found to be more effective when travelers have diversified cost structures than identical cost structures, and congestion is better reduced with heterogeneous traveler composition than with single composition. This is consistent with earlier studies in the literature. In addition, the simulation results indicate that omniscient pricing in general reduces Expected Total Social Cost (with or without the return of the congestion fee). However, the ultimate benefits of a certain pricing scheme depend on travelers' cost structure as well as the composition of late-tolerant, late-averse and late-neutral travelers in the entire population; extreme situations such as 100% late-averse or 100% latetolerant traveler composition deserves extra attention when analyzing different pricing schemes.
INTRODUCTION
Traffic congestion is one of the most frustrating problems in both freight and passenger transportation. Over the years a number of models have been developed separately with different aims, trying to bring out the issues involved as clearly as possible. Broadly speaking these models can be classified as econometric models, queuing theoretic models, game theoretic models and bottleneck models. Specifically, econometric models employ time-dependent demand and delay functions with crude specifications of queue evolution, while queuing theoretic models introduced stochastic queue evolutions but generally considered the arrival rates as exogenous variables irrelevant to equilibrium fees (Daniel 1992) . Game theoretic models were mostly applied to explain behaviors in conflicting situations, e.g. (Kita 1999; Marcucci and Marini 2003) , while a recent game-theoretic model developed by Levinson explored the "micro-foundations" of congestion and pricing considering the interactions of departure strategies of two or more travelers (Levinson 2005) . Vickrey developed the first bottleneck model to study the efficiency gains and temporal distribution of departure times resulted from congestion pricing (Vickrey 1969) . The principal innovation of Vickrey's bottleneck model was that individual departure times were endogenized and the evolution of congestion over the rush hour can be determined within the model itself . Several researchers extended the original bottleneck model in a number of directions. Smith gave a general proof of the existence of no-fee single bottleneck equilibrium (Smith 1984) while Daganzo showed that Smith's equilibrium is unique (Daganzo 1985) . Henderson improved the Vickrey model by modifying the deterministic queuing process with a form of random flow congestion (Henderson 1985) ; Ben-Akiva et al. developed a dynamic adjustments model of commuters and tested various model parameters (Ben-Akiva et al. 1984) .
Moreover, Arnott et al. developed a network model of parallel routes and analyzed the efficiency gains of step tolls instead of continuously varying tolls . Recently, Daniel combined Vickrey's bottleneck model with queuing theoretic model and developed a hybrid model for airport operations that captures the stochastic nature of arrivals and inter-temporal adjustments of scheduled arrival time as a result of congestion pricing (Daniel 1992; Daniel 1995; Daniel 2001) .
In this paper, a stochastic congestion and pricing model is proposed combining a bottleneck model with stochastic queuing for studying roadway congestion and pricing using an N-player game to model driver interactions. In this model, there is a single destination and travelers' desired arrival time are assumed to be uniformly distributed. Each traveler selects the "best" departure time that minimizes his total travel cost, which is the sum of journey cost, early and late penalties plus a congestion toll. Most importantly, travelers are differentiated by their late-acceptance level, i.e. their willingness to be late, and the effects of various compositions of late-averse, late-tolerant and late-neutral travelers on congestion patterns with and without pricing are discussed. Similar to the bottleneck model, a bottleneck is assumed to exist immediately prior to the destination, yet the travel time from the origin to the bottleneck is no longer assumed to be constant, rather a probability distribution is considered which essentially introduces stochastic elements into the system rendering the arrival rate and queue size at the bottleneck random. The queue evolution is modeled as a Markov-Poisson process following a similar approach employed in Daniel's original development (Daniel 1992) and two pricing schemes are developed based on the expected marginal cost caused by the increased expected arrival rate upon a traveler's selection of departure time. These two schemes reflect two pricing perspectives: one is the omniscient perspective for which the transportation administrative agency is assumed to know each and every traveler's cost structure (i.e., their detailed valuation of journey cost as well as early and late penalties), and the other observable perspective for which only queuing delay is considered.
The organization of this paper is as follows. The formulation of the proposed model is detailed in Section 2. In Section 3, the model is numerically tested using various scenarios with different traveler compositions and pricing schemes. The last section discusses implications and gives concluding remarks.
MODEL

Model Assumptions
Consider a situation where N travelers are planning their trips between their respective origins and a single destination with their desired arrival time uniformly distributed over a certain time period.
Assume that there exists a bottleneck immediately before the destination with maximum queuing Xin, Wuping and D. Levinson (2007) Stochastic congestion and pricing model with endogenous departure time selection and heterogeneous travelers Figure 1 illustrates the above assumptions. As shown in this figure, the total journey time from an origin to the destination is essentially the summation of the travel time from the origin to the bottleneck location, and the queuing delay plus a fixed service time at the bottleneck. In the figure, the queuing delay time at the bottleneck is described as "random" inasmuch as queue length at any given time of day is unpredictable.
However, the queuing delay is deterministic insofar as service time per vehicle is deterministic.
Importantly, in the proposed model, each traveler is characterized by their respective cost structures, i.e., the specific valuation of journey time, early and late penalties in relation to a desired arrival time. Each traveler with a specific cost structure needs to select an "optimal" departure time such that the total trip cost is minimized. Because of the randomness of travel time and stochastic queue evolution at the bottleneck, the total travel cost for an individual traveler given a selected departure time is random as well. This means, each traveler has to select this departure time based on the expected total travel cost which is composed of expected journey cost plus expected late and early penalties. 
Congestion Model Formulation
The congestion model is formulated as follows. First, the time horizon is discretized by an interval equivalent to the bottleneck service time service t and indexed by integers sequentially. Let n D denote the selected departure time of traveler n, and ( | ) n n p t D denote the probability that traveler n who departs at n D actually arrives at the bottleneck at time t . With a total of N travelers, the expected bottleneck arrival rate at time t can be expressed as:
denote the M+1-dimensional probability vector (M is the queuing capacity of the bottleneck) describing the distribution of the number of queuing vehicles at the bottleneck; that is,
where ( ) i q t is the probability that at time t there are i queuing vehicles at the bottleneck.
If we assume only one queuing vehicle can be served at the beginning of each interval, then the dynamics of ( ) t q can be described using a Markov chain as ( ) ( ) ( )
where ( ) t Q is the transition matrix given as: 
The element of transition matrix ( ) t Q at row i and column j , denoted as ij Q , describes the probability that at time t there are j queuing vehicle while at time (t+1) the number of queuing vehicles becomes i , i.e.,
where ( ) t π represents the number of bottleneck queuing vehicles at time t.
Let n J denote the journey cost, n E the early penalty, n L the late penalty, and n A the desired arrival time of traveler n , then the total travel cost for traveler n who departs the origin at n D and arrives at the bottleneck at t can be expressed as:
The first term of the right hand side of Equation (2.6) is the expected journey cost of traveler n, which includes the cost of traveling to the bottleneck ( 
refers to both the number of queuing vehicle at the bottleneck at time t, as well as the queuing delay time the vehicle is about to experience (i.e., the number of intervals the vehicle has to wait in queue). Similarly, the second and third term on the right hand side of Equation (2.6) give the expected cost of being early and expected cost of being late respectively in relation to the desired arrival time n A .
User-optimal Departure Time Selection
Immediately based on Equation (2.6) , the expected total personal cost (ETPC) of traveler n over all possible arrival time t can be expressed as
Traveler n will select a departure time n D to minimize expected total personal cost, i.e.,
Equilibrium will be achieved when no traveler can lower expected total personal cost by unilaterally changing departure time, i.e., the user-optimal departure time schedule
where
System-optimal Departure Time Selection
The expected total social cost of N travelers is:
System-optimal departure pattern is one that optimizes the expected total social cost:
Pricing Schemes
Omniscient Pricing
Assuming the transportation administrative agency is omniscient about each individual traveler's cost structure, i.e., the valuation of n J , n E and n L , as well as the desired arrival time n A , for
, then a time-dependent "Omniscient" pricing scheme imposing congestion fee contingent upon the actual arrival time t is:
Clearly, this fee is equivalent to the expected increase in the costs of all travelers caused by increased expected arrival rate at time t. It can be shown that a time-dependent congestion fee as defined in Equation (2.13) will result in a departure pattern that minimizes the expected total social cost as defined in Equation(2.11). To see this, note that the first order condition to minimize the expected total social cost defined in Equation (2.11) is
Here the second term in (2.14) is the marginal increase in all travelers costs induced by the th n traveler's departure time selection.
When congestion fee ( ) F t is imposed, each traveler n will select a departure time n D to minimize expected total personal cost; here traveler n's total expected personal cost n ETPC including the congestion fee is expressed as:
Assume that individual travelers would treat their own cost n C and the congestion fee ( ) F t parametrically and fix them to be constant when selecting departure time, then the first order condition for n ETPC to be minimized is:
Arrange Equation (2.16) to obtain the following:
According to Equation (2.1),
Equation (2.18) is essentially the same first order condition as Equation (2.14) for minimizing expected total social cost (ETSC) when no fee is imposed.
Observable Pricing
Usually an individual traveler's cost structure is unobservable to the transportation administrative agency; hence a more realistic pricing scheme would only impose a congestion fee upon queuing delay which is relatively easy to observe or to infer. This gives an observable pricing ( ) F t as follows:
which is the queuing delay cost for traveler n. The congestion fee defined in Equation (2.19) essentially equals the marginal increase of queuing cost for all travelers in relation to the marginal increase of expected arrival rate at time t.
Numerical Computation of Congestion Fee
In order to compute the congestion fees ( ) F t and ( ) F t , numerical evaluations of ( | ) ( ) 
Then using chain rule it is easy to obtain
t q u q t t (u)... (t + 2) (t +1) t u t t q t q u t
With (2.20) the congestion fees ( ) F t and ( ) F t can be easily evaluated. Note the derivation approach is not original here but follows (Daniel, 1995) .
Algorithm to Find Equilibrium
Under the proposed congestion and pricing model, a traveler's expected total personal cost (ETPC)
can be expressed as ( | ) ( | ) 
Based on the above equilibrium conditions, a heuristic searching algorithm is developed in this paper for finding equilibrium points.
Heuristic Equilibrium Searching Algorithm (HESA)
Step 0 Step 2:
Set n:= n+1;
If n ≤ N go to Step 1; else go to Step 3
Step 3: ETPC and go to Step 1. Here ε is a predefined tolerance.
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
The proposed congestion and pricing model has been implemented as a stand alone C++ program to facilitate the study of different congestion patterns in relation to various late-acceptance levels of travelers with and without pricing. It is important to clarify that here "late" is specifically in relation to a desired arrival time. For the simulation experiment reported in this paper, the travel time distribution from the origin to the bottleneck location is assumed to be a Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the congestion patterns under these scenarios. Specifically, Figure 2 compares the congestion patterns under scenario 1 and scenario 2 as they represent two extreme situations. As shown in Figure 2 , when no pricing is imposed, under scenario 1 the congestion pattern is skewed towards the left (i.e., arriving early), while under scenario 2 the congestion pattern is more skewed towards the right, meaning travelers do not favor early departure. These congestion patterns are expected, as under scenario 1 all travelers are late-averse travelers and they would try to avoid arriving late by selecting early departures. While under scenario 2 all travelers are late-tolerant travelers and they would not care so much about being late while they have high penalties for being early. In contrast to the "skewed" pattern in Figure 2 , Figure 3 shows that when all the travelers are late-neutral or the three types of travelers are equally distributed (33.3% each), the congestion patterns are approximately symmetric around their desired arrival time. Clearly, this is because when the late-acceptance level among travelers is equally distributed, the influence of late-averse travelers and the influence of late-tolerant travelers on congestion pattern are offsetting each other, resulting in a similar pattern that can be achieved when all the travelers are late-neutral. 2) all the travelers are late-averse ( Figure 5); 3) all the travelers are late-tolerant (early-averse) ( Figure 6 );
Figures 4, 5, and 6 illustrate the effects of different pricing schemes on congestion patterns. As is clearly illustrated, omniscient pricing is most effective in suppressing peak hour congestion and distributing demands over a longer time horizon. The observable pricing scheme is also effective, but because it is only based on queuing cost and ignores associated early or late penalties, congestion is suppressed but to a less extent. Additionally, one interesting observation is that congestion is more spread out (suppressed) with heterogeneous traveler composition ( Figure 4) than with a single traveler-type composition ( Figure 5 and Figure 6 ). This seems to suggest that congestion pricing is most effective when travelers have diversified cost structures than when travelers have identical cost structures. Table 2 imply that social welfare is generally improved with omniscient pricing vis-à-vis observable pricing. However, it has been noted that, when all the travelers are late-tolerant, the ETSC (with the addition of congestion fee) resulting from observable pricing is smaller than omniscient pricing. Obviously in this case, the addition of a congestion fee exceeds the initial cost savings, so the use of the congestion fee becomes crucial to determining full welfare impacts. In particular, if revenue is returned to travelers, we get a different welfare outcome than when it is not. Table 3 summarizes the revenues generated from tolling. As can be expected, omniscient pricing in general generates more revenues because it considers the complete cost structure including journey cost and early/late penalties for individual travelers, while observable pricing only considers journey cost. Also it is found that when all the travelers are risk averse, the revenue generated with omniscient pricing becomes less than observable pricing; yet Table 2 indicates the Expected Total Social Cost under omniscient pricing is still smaller than observable pricing. This seems to suggest that the amount of revenue generated by a certain pricing scheme cannot be employed as a sole indicator to assess the effectiveness of that pricing scheme and the ultimate benefits should be assessed comprehensively. This becomes even clearer when revenues are returned to travelers as equal shares (Table 4) . 
SUMMARY
This paper proposes a stochastic congestion and pricing model that takes into account travelers endogenous departure time selections. Under this model travelers are assumed to have a uniformly distributed desired arrival time for a given OD pair, and each traveler selects the "best" departure time to minimize expected total personal cost, which is the summation of journey cost, early penalty and late penalty and congestion fee. Two pricing schemes reflect two different assumptions about knowledge on the part of the tolling agency: one is an omniscient perspective for which the transportation administrative agency is assumed to know each and every traveler's cost structure (i.e., their detailed valuation of journey cost as well as early and late penalties), and the other observable perspective for which only queuing delay is considered. The effects of different pricing schemes on congestion pattern with varied late-averse, late-tolerant and lateneutral travelers compositions are explored. Numerical simulation suggests that the omniscient pricing scheme is most effective in suppressing peak hour congestion and distributing demands over longer time horizon. Also congestion is reduced when the traveler composition is heterogeneous. This suggests that congestion pricing is more effective when travelers have diversified cost structures than identical cost structures. In addition, the simulation results indicate that when compared to observable pricing omniscient pricing in general reduces Expected Total Social Cost (with or without the addition of congestion fee); this implies social welfare could be improved with omniscient pricing vis-à-vis observable pricing. However more travelers improve welfare individually with observable rather than omniscient pricing. The ultimate benefits of any pricing scheme depend on traveler cost structure as well as the composition of late-tolerant, lateaverse and late-neutral travelers in the entire population.
Finally, it is worthwhile to stress that the above conclusions are based on numerical simulations and have not been proven here in a general sense. The effect of heterogeneity of traveler compositions is not easy to determine a priori, especially without comprehensive sensitivity analysis. This is because heterogeneity affects costs both with and without tolling, and the welfare impact of tolling depends on the difference in costs. Some earlier studies with the deterministic bottleneck model (e.g., Cohen 1987; Arnott et al. 1994) have shown that the welfare impacts of congestion pricing depend on the relative magnitude of heterogeneity in the cost function parameters. Daniel (2001) found that heterogeneity of costs tends to improve the welfaredistributional impacts of congestion pricing. These earlier findings are consistent with the study in this paper while comprehensive sensitivity tests of the model are currently underway by the authors to enable drawing more general conclusions from the model. In addition, it should be mentioned that Arnott and Kraus (1998) showed that if tolls can be varied freely over time and travelers cannot overtake each other, anonymous tolls (i.e., tolls that are independent of traveler type) suffice to support a system optimum; also with pure bottleneck queuing congestion the optimal toll should be able to eliminate queuing while maintaining capacity flow through the bottleneck. However, in this study, the observable toll performs less well than the omniscient toll.
This can be attributed to fact that the arrival rate of vehicles at the queue is not deterministic as in the basic bottleneck model but random.
